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For at least fifteen years prior to the Arab uprisings of 2010/2011, the European 
Union had a policy for the promotion of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, 
freedom of expression and civil society activism in the southern Mediterranean. Yet 
the EU and its member states were taken by surprise when mass demonstrations 
across the Arab world challenged the dictatorial regimes of Tunisia, then Egypt and 
beyond, from December 2010. While they had celebrated the progress made by 
Arab regimes on several economic indicators, the EU had become complacent about 
the persistence of autocratic rule.  
At the time of the Arab revolts, Europe was still preoccupied with its own financial 
crises. However, once presented with the spectacle of mass demonstrations in 
Tunisia and the knock-on effect in neighbouring Egypt, EU leaders realized that 
something momentous was underway and opted to welcome the demonstrators’ 
demands for change. Within weeks the EU announced a recalibration of its policies 
and institutional arrangements to support political reform, and allocated additional 
funds for the purpose. When Libyans challenged the dictatorship of Muammar al 
Qaddafi and he marshalled his forces to crush them, France and Britain acted 
quickly to galvanize an international response that included NATO air and maritime 
support for the rebels. The EU suspended all cooperation with the Qaddafi regime; 
imposed sanctions on individuals and entities and, following deliberations, launched 
a plan of action to support Libya through its post-Qaddafi transition. 
Some three years on, however, the forces of counter-revolution had succeeded in 
either containing or reversing the movement for change, as in Egypt; or, in the case 
of Syria, had reduced the country to all-out civil war. In Libya, the elected 
government was forced to flee the capital in the face of opposition and turf battles 
among rival militias. Only in Tunisia did a broad-based commitment to democracy 
and the rule of law prevail. 
To attribute the reversals of the quest for democracy in Egypt and Libya to the 
failings of the EU would be to accord too much weight to its capacity to influence the 
course of events in either country. Equally, as noted in Chapter 2, the EU could not 
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claim credit for the comparative success of the reform movement in Tunisia, though 
it was generally supportive. In all cases, the EU was a player, but not a leading one; 
and, as will be documented here, it could have been more effective than it was. Yet, 
as also discussed here, the main failings of the EU in the context of the Arab revolts 
have to do with the very nature of the EU itself: its conflicting objectives, institutional 
inertia and diffuse power structure. 
As discussed in all three chapters in Part I of this volume, on the transitions in Egypt, 
Tunisia and Libya, the impetus for regime change in these countries was principally 
the product of indigenous factors and dynamics. In all cases also local actors were 
willing to accept international assistance only on their terms. Had the EU sought to 
intervene directly and try to manage the course of change, that would have run 
counter to the whole ethos of democratic legitimacy, quite probably producing a 
backlash of criticism against the EU. In a sense, the EU was destined to be ‘damned 
if it did, and damned if it didn’t’ act more vigorously. Conscious of this dilemma, the 
EU erred on the side of caution, and in a way consistent with EU norms and 
institutional inertia.  The results were disappointing for the champions of democracy 
on both sides of the Mediterranean. 
EU policy-making process 
A Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been an EU objective since the 
European Community was transformed into the European Union in 1992. That 
transition coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Western Europe’s 
embrace of the newly independent East and Central European states as candidate 
members of the EU. Their incorporation meant the expansion of EU membership 
from 15 states in 1995 to 25 states in 2004 (now 28 states). Inevitably, the task of 
agreeing a CFSP among all the members became more cumbersome and 
demanding.  
In an effort to streamline the process, under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty (2007), a 
new post of High Representative (of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), 
to be held in conjunction with Vice Presidency of the European Commission (the 
EU’s executive body), was created (hereinafter referred to as HR/VP). A dedicated 
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new EU diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was also 
established. The Tunisian uprising coincided with Catherine Ashton’s first year in the 
post of HR/VP, and the EEAS began operation only in January 2011 – so it was a 
major challenge for the EU to produce a coherent response immediately. That said, 
Ashton was able to use the opportunity to establish her visibility1, and waded into 
controversy in the process.2 
Scholars who specialize on the institutions and procedures of the EU have written 
extensively on the implications of these new arrangements.3The net effect was to 
create a new echelon of offices and institutions which sat uneasily alongside and 
overlapped with the existing ones. Consequently, with respect to the Arab uprisings, 
pronouncements and policy statements came not only from the HR/VP Ashton, but 
also from the President of the European Council (Herman Van Rompuy), the 
President of the European Commission (José Manuel Barroso), the Commissioner 
for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy (Stefan Füle) and, after his appointment 
in July 2011, the Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean (Bernadino 
Léon). Furthermore, while the HR/VP was broadly understood to be the lead voice 
on EU policy positions, she did not have control of decisions about the disbursement 
of aid – which was the responsibility of the European Commission.4  
In response to the challenge of the Arab uprisings, the HR/VP created yet more 
institutions, including the aforementioned Representative for the Southern 
                                            
1
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-101_en.htm?locale=en; 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/feb/04/egypt-tunisia-eu-deep-democracy  
2
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8303929/Egypt-
crisis-David-Cameron-reprimands-Baroness-Ashton-at-EU-summit.html  
3
 See for example: Smith, M E (2004) Europe’s foreign and security policy: the 
institutionalization of cooperation, Cambridge University Press: http://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-
details/article/europaeischer_auswaertiger_dienst.html; 
http://www.ceps.be/book/reviewing-member-states%E2%80%99-commitment-european-
external-action-service; and 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=50020. 
 
4
 Federica Bicchi (2014) ‘The Politics of Foreign Aid and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy Post-Arab Spring: ‘More for More’ of Less for the Same?’ Mediterranean Politics 
19:3, 318–332, at p. 320. 
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Mediterranean and three dedicated Task Forces – for Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt. 
While this signalled a readiness to focus on the specific needs and challenges 
arising during the transitions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, these arrangements also 
further complicated policy formulation and implementation. On the ground, the EEAS 
diplomats had a further problem of coordinating with the missions of EU member 
states in these countries. Meanwhile, the governments of the EU member states 
were free to develop their own individual initiatives and funding streams. In the case 
of Libya, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France and Prime Minister David Cameron of 
Britain effectively upstaged the EU with their calls to action.  
Policy Substance 
As mentioned, some fifteen years before the start of the Arab uprisings the EU 
already had a policy to promote political as well as economic reform in its southern 
neighbourhood. Launched in Barcelona in 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
Programme (EMP) embodied a three-tier agenda for economic, political and cultural, 
and security cooperation intended to turn the Mediterranean into a more integrated 
region. The programme made some advances in persuading Arab governments in 
North Africa, including Tunisia and Egypt but excluding Libya, which was then under 
a sanctions regime in connection with the Lockerbie airliner bombing, to institute 
some economic reforms. It failed, however, to prompt much in the way of political 
reforms. 
The Arab states of North Africa also resisted EU inducements to promote South–
South trade and transport links. The main reason was the persistence of cross-
border rivalries, security concerns and disputes. Libya was not included in the EMP 
in any case. Because each of the EU’s Arab partner states in the EMP operated 
unilaterally, the EU formed the hub and engine of the process, effectively dealing 
with each of the Mediterranean Partner states individually, thereby undermining the 
concept of partnership between North and South. 
Crucially, the EMP actually reinforced the economic advantages of the EU. Arab 
partner states were obliged to open their markets to European investors and to 
remove trade and tariff barriers on manufactured goods. Yet the EU only undertook a 
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progressive reduction of its tariff barriers on the import of agricultural products from 
North Africa – some of which were kept in place to protect southern European 
farmers from competition from across the Mediterranean. Furthermore, while 
promoting the free flow of capital and goods (with some exceptions), the EMP did not 
allow for the free flow of labour: the common market principles upheld inside the EU 
were not fully replicated in the Mediterranean Partnership. 
To the disappointment of the EU, Arab business leaders proved adept at creating 
private monopolies and crony capitalism in the southern neighbourhood, and the 
anticipated market liberalization failed to benefit smaller businesses and the middle 
classes. Overall, the EMP formula compounded the very economic problems – high 
youth unemployment, low wages, rising living costs and corruption – that contributed 
to the Arab uprisings.5 
Regarding political reform, meanwhile, Arab regimes were able to argue to their EU 
interlocutors that security concerns prevented them from instituting democratization 
for fear that the results would be destabilizing and would benefit Islamists. For its 
part, the EU was so keen to curtail inward migration and gain the cooperation of 
Arab governments on this and combatting terrorism that it avoided pushing for 
political reform and settled for cosmetic measures instead.6 As reported to the author 
by former British and US officials, former President Mubarak of Egypt countered 
every European proposal to improve human rights in Egypt, especially in respect to 
political prisoners, with accusations that Western governments were themselves so 
inept at dealing with extremism that they had no business telling the Egyptians what 
to do.7 The Mubarak regime made non-interference in Egyptian internal politics a 
condition for cooperation on international security. 
                                            
5
 Europe’s inadvertent role in the genesis of the Arab revolts, through policies which widened 
the wealth gap between North and South and within Arab economies, is discussed in 
Rosemary Hollis (2012) ‘No friend of democratisation: Europe’s role in the genesis of the 
Arab Spring’, International Affairs 88:1, 81–94. 
6
 http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/5080133.pdf  
7
 See Rosemary Hollis (2013) ‘Mubarak: The embodiment of “moderate Arab leadership”?’ 
in Lawrence Freedman and Jeffrey Michaels, eds, Scripting Middle East Leaders: the Impact 
of Leadership Perceptions on US and UK Foreign Policy London: Bloomsbury. 
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In the wake of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the US side launched a new 
initiative to promote democracy in the Arab world, the EU countered with a new 
initiative of its own. This was the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which 
introduced the concept of ‘differentiation’ to EU dealings with its Arab neighbours. 
The idea was to calibrate the EU’s proposals for reform to the relative capacity of its 
partner countries to adopt such measures. Implementation of the formula involved 
providing each Arab government with a list of potential reforms – extracted from the 
body of law (the acquis communautaire) that all EU membership candidates are 
obliged to incorporate into their legal systems – from which to choose a short list for 
adoption. That list would then form the basis of an ‘Action Plan’ agreed with the EU 
and against which progress would be measured over time.  
Following negotiations, both Tunisia and Egypt did agree on Action Plans. As the 
Tunisians themselves indicated at the time, they had little choice, given that the EU 
constitutes its biggest trading partner.8 The Egyptians took a tougher line on what to 
include in their Action Plan and managed to avoid signing up to anything they 
specifically did not want with respect to political reform. Technically, conditionality 
was incorporated in the Action Plans,  but the EU was not rigorous in implementing 
this, in part because its bureaucrats could not make political decisions. More 
crucially, however, significant financial rewards were not attached to compliance.  
The reward held out by the EU was simply greater returns on exports through 
expanded access to the EU internal market. To attain increased access, the partner 
countries were expected to introduce EU standards into their own economies and 
thence drive a process of ‘harmonization’ with EU internal market standards. Some 
development aid was made available to partner countries to smooth the process, but 
the whole philosophy behind the EU strategy was a belief in economic liberalization, 
with scant regard for the near-term consequences in the partner economies. Already 
at a disadvantage in relation to EU economies, the partners were expected to take 
                                            
8
 In 2011, 74.2% of Tunisia’s total exports went to the EU and 63.1% of its imports came 
from the EU. See Hrant Kostanyan and Elitsa Garnizova (2013) ‘Tunisia in turmoil: How 
should the EU react?’ CEPS Commentary 4 March 2013. 
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all the pains of harmonization without any of the benefits, such as labour mobility and 
infrastructure development aid, accorded to new member states of the EU. 
This aspect of EU policy to promote an area of ‘shared prosperity’ in the 
Mediterranean reveals a fundamental blind spot in EU thinking. Essentially it 
amounts to an assumption that neighbouring countries, while denied the full benefits 
of EU membership, are nonetheless bound to benefit from becoming at least a little 
bit more like the EU economies.9 A similar set of assumptions about EU values such 
as democracy, freedom of expression, an independent judiciary and respect for 
human rights seems to have informed EU thinking about the benefits of political 
reform in the neighbourhood. This could be summarized as: ‘the more you espouse 
our values the more you will resemble us, and that will be good for you and for us’! 
Prior to the Arab uprisings, Arab regimes were not convinced. They understood well 
that opening up their systems to democracy, freedom of expression and 
accountability would spell the end of their regimes. They also understood that wealth 
distribution inside the EU was such that they could operate a democratic system 
without fear of revolution; and that free market capitalism works once an economy 
has passed an initial stage of development, but that before such a stage has been 
reached, an economy could be wiped out by competition. Finally, Arab regimes were 
party to the special pleadings of European leaders to do bilateral deals to stem 
migration flows, to protect the EU from an influx of migrants that would upset the 
prevailing social harmony and perhaps also open the doors to potential terrorists. 
By the time of the Arab uprisings, the Arabs had witnessed the effects on Europe of 
the global financial crises and thus had new reasons to question EU advice on how 
best to manage economic development. In light of this, it is remarkable that the 
Europeans themselves seem not to have questioned their own assumptions when 
the ‘Arab Spring’ erupted. They did, however, express regret that they had not done 
more to promote their own democracy agenda in the recent past and vowed to make 
amends. 
                                            
9
 http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2013/11/15/4343451d-0db7-4451-a4c6-
ba0e3a9ba008/publishable_en.pdf  
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EU Response to ‘the Arab Spring’ 
In their initial responses to the Arab uprisings, EU officials declared support for the 
‘democratic aspirations’ of the people; called on the authorities to forego the use of 
force; and offered to engage in dialogue with both sides to help achieve a peaceful 
transition to democracy.10 In March 2011 the EU launched a new policy initiative, ‘A 
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean’.11 
This was followed in May with ‘A New Response to a Changing 
Neighbourhood;’12and in September that year, a programme of ‘Support for 
Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING)’13 was announced. 
The March 2011 initiative declared that the EU could not be a ‘passive spectator’ of 
developments, but should ‘support wholeheartedly the wish of the people in our 
neighbourhood to enjoy the same freedoms that we take as our right’. Citing the 
EU’s own ‘proud tradition of supporting countries in transition from autocratic 
regimes to democracy’ (in southern, eastern and central Europe) the EU promised 
support for those neighbourhood states ‘able and willing’ to embark on reform within 
a partnership. The EU would take a ‘differentiated’ and ‘incentive-based approach’ it 
said; a ‘commitment to adequately monitored, free and fair elections should be the 
entry qualification for the Partnership’. Emphasis was placed on the importance of 
civil society, for which expanded EU support would include a new ‘Civil Society 
Neighbourhood Facility’.  
On the vexed issue of freedom of movement, the EU proposed ‘Mobility 
Partnerships’ to better ‘manage’ the movement of persons between the EU and 
partner countries and facilitate greater mobility for students, researchers and 
businesspeople. Embedded in this provision was a pledge to support ‘capacity 
                                            
10
 See for example: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/118865.pdf ; 
http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/arabspring/Egypt_1_Statement
s_EUHR_28Jan2011.pdf  
11
 Brussels, 8.3.2011 COM(2011) 200 final, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/com2011_200_en.pdf  
12
 Brussels, 25/05/2011 COM(2011) 303, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf  
13
 See Euro-Med Info Centre  http://www.enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id=394&id_type=10  
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building’ in border management, ‘preventing and fighting against irregular migration 
and trafficking in human beings, including through enhanced maritime surveillance; 
the return of irregular migrants…and for enhancing the capacity and abilities of law 
enforcement authorities to effectively fight trans-border organized crime and 
corruption’14. 
With respect to economic development, the EU pledged more support for Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises and job creation. Agreement was to be sought from EU 
member states for an increase in European Investment Bank (EIB) lending by EUR 1 
billion and to extend the EBRD mandate to countries in the southern Mediterranean. 
On trade, the EU undertook to ‘accelerate the conclusion and EU approval of trade 
liberalization agreements, notably on agricultural and fisheries products with Tunisia 
and Morocco’15 (Egypt and Jordan having recently gained preferential access for 
such products). The idea of ‘Deep Free Trade Areas’(DFTA) was proposed, as was 
enhanced cooperation in the energy sector, education, rural development and 
communication technologies.   
The message of the ‘Partnership for Democracy’ initiative was that the EU would 
provide ‘more for more’:  more assistance (technical and financial), from existing and 
some new funds, for more progress toward reform in the southern Mediterranean 
countries. The ‘New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood’ initiative of May 2011 
elaborated on the approach outlined in the March document, emphasizing that all 
support would be conditional upon demonstrable progress in the desired direction, in 
particular progress on building what the EU called ‘deep and sustainable 
democracy’. This was to entail: 
 free and fair elections  freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media  the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial  fighting against corruption 
                                            
14
 Brussels, 8.3.2011 COM(2011) 200 final, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/com2011_200_en.pdf ; p.7. 
15
 Brussels, 8.3.2011 COM(2011) 200 final, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/com2011_200_en.pdf; p.9. 
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 security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the 
establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces.16 
 
The ‘New Response’ document also pledged a ‘simplified and coherent policy and 
programme framework’, such that in future ENP Action Plans and EU assistance 
would focus on a smaller number of priorities, backed with more precise 
benchmarks. It stated that the new approach would require additional resources of 
up to EUR 1242 million until 2013. 
The SPRING initiative of September 2011, the budget for which was EUR 350 million 
for 2011/2012, re-emphasized the ‘more for more’ principle. Focusing specifically on 
Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, promised: 
In the area of democratic transition, depending on the rhythm of reform in 
each country, the programme will provide support in the field of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, democratic governance, freedom of association, 
expression and assembly and free press and media, public administration, 
rule of law and fight against corruption.  
  
To assist countries towards reaching sustainable growth and economic 
development, SPRING will support a better regulatory framework for 
business, increased numbers of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs); as 
well as a reduction in internal social and economic disparities.17 
 
As this summary indicates, the EU was typically thorough in its articulation of the 
principles, goals, parameters and mechanisms of its policy. Yet therein lies part of 
the problem. The 2011 recalibration of EU policy in the Mediterranean 
Neighbourhood reads precisely like that – a recalibration of the EU’s pre-existing 
approach to its southern neighbours. So elaborate and comprehensive had the EU 
                                            
16
 Brussels, 25/05/2011 COM(2011) 303, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf p.3. 
17
 http://www.enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id=394&id_type=10 
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vision of good-neighbourly relations become that its officials could not step outside or 
see above it. The documents embrace the aspirations voiced by Arab demonstrators 
as an affirmation that they wanted exactly what the Europeans have – in terms of 
freedoms and prosperity – and thence drew the conclusion that more rigorous and 
urgent implementation of programmes based on those adopted to promote 
democracy and economic development in new EU member states was the answer. 
There was definitely an element of contrition in the way the policy was framed. The 
EU leaders regretted that they had all but given up on pressing Arab governments to 
democratize prior to 2011. Their reasons were understandable: the Arab leaders had 
simply rebuffed their pious words with accusations of cultural imperialism and/or 
reminders about their shared security agenda. Consequently, while the EU 
bureaucrats concentrated on pressing regulatory reform in narrow sectors that would 
achieve greater harmonization with the EU internal market, the leaders of EU 
member states focused on bilateral diplomatic relations and security agreements. 
Meanwhile, the EU institutions tasked with managing migration focused on 
increasingly elaborate schemes to control migration flows, for which the cooperation 
of Arab regimes was essential. 
Arab civil society actors were marginalized in the process. In any case, Arab regimes 
resisted EU efforts to direct funds to civil society activists if the latter appeared 
dedicated to challenging authority in the Arab states. Over time, the EU obviously 
hoped that its economic reform programmes would enhance the capacity of the 
middle classes in the Arab partner states and that they might become the drivers of 
progress toward democracy. Yet, as noted above, in the decade preceding the Arab 
Spring the middle classes had gained little from economic liberalization – only 
business magnates in collusion with the regimes did. Middle-class youth were 
prominent in the uprisings. However, as subsequent developments revealed, they 
were not sufficiently well organized or practised in political activism to sustain the 
momentum through electoral processes that gave an opportunity to Islamists who did 
have an established societal base and defined leadership. 
The problem for the EU, once the uprisings began, was to establish lines of 
communication with the new contenders for power without appearing to take sides in 
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what were supposed to be transitions to democracy. Ideologically the EU placed 
itself on the side of the secular moderates, yet when they did not do as well as the 
Islamists in the first elections in Tunisia and Egypt, the Europeans felt bound to 
accept the will of the Tunisian and Egyptian people.  Keen to make amends for their 
previous indulgence of dictators, meanwhile, they made their support of the new 
administrations more conditional than in the past – thereby penalizing the new 
democrats for the sins of the dictators.  
Additionally, EU democracy and bureaucracy would not allow for unaccountable 
disbursements of aid to any regime – in stark contrast to the way Gulf Arab 
governments set about propping up their preferred clients in the transition states. 
Apart from EU humanitarian aid – which was forthcoming for Tunisia and Libya to 
help these countries deal with the refugee crises that followed the uprisings – EU aid 
was disbursed almost entirely through the pre-existing mechanisms of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) or in the form of development loans. 
Neither constituted cash in hand for governments facing economic crises brought on 
by the uprisings. In addition, as Federica Bicchi has pointed out, even though the EU 
increased substantially the amount of money it committed to support the Arab 
transitions: ‘there can be a considerable time lag between the programming of funds, 
their commitment and their actual disbursement’.18 
Another reason Bicchi identifies for why the EU actually spent less than it promised 
in 2011–2013 was that ‘the rapid turnover of actors has left the EU with a limited set 
of interlocutors, as the more interesting developments occur at a faster pace than the 
EU reaction time’.19 In other words, the capacity of the designated recipient countries 
to absorb EU funding under its normal procedures had meant that funds committed 
remained unspent, though they were not cancelled as a result. In a sense, given the 
way the EU operates, the Arab transitional regimes would have to succeed first, 
before they could receive funding intended to help them succeed.  
                                            
18
 Federica Bicchi (2014) ‘The politics of foreign aid and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy post-Arab Spring: “more for more” of less for the same?’ Mediterranean Politics 19:3, 
318–332, at p. 326. 
19
 Ibid., p.328. 
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Tunisia 
When the uprising began in Tunisia in December 2010, the EU was in the process of 
negotiating a new agreement under the ENP with the Ben Ali government, which 
was praised for its record on reform. Initial reactions in Europe were mixed, with the 
French considering whether intervention to support Ben Ali was appropriate. 
However, events unfolded rapidly and when the Tunisian army refused to take up 
arms against the people, Ben Ali fled and revelations emerged on the extent of his 
family’s extravagance and corruption, there was really no possibility of defending 
him. As would be the case with Libya later, the British and French leaders Cameron 
and Sarkozy were among the first to seize the moment and side with the people. 
The EU signalled its support for the revolution in a series of high-level official visits, 
starting with the HR/VP Ashton on 14 February 2011. She was followed by 
Commission President Barroso, Commissioners Füle, Malmström, Georgieva, 
Barnier and De Gucht, as well as European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek. 
Reflecting the EU’s previous belief in Tunisia’s potential, as well as contrition about 
the EU’s complicity with Ben Ali, there was initially a palpable sense of commitment 
to help the transition in Tunisia work. Although attention soon switched to 
developments in Egypt, where the stakes were considered much higher, and then 
Libya, because of the commitment of military forces – that was not totally to the 
detriment of Tunisia. The sense prevailed that the constituents for a successful 
transition were as present there as anywhere; and (as noted in Chapter 2) other 
regional actors were less inclined to interfere in Tunisia than they were in Egypt or in 
Syria, for instance. 
Also, since Tunisia had already advanced along the path of economic reform under 
the ENP umbrella, and possessed a competent bureaucracy, there was a basis upon 
which to extend more aid and support through existing structures. The EU doubled 
the funds available for bilateral cooperation in 2011 and increased the budget for 
2011–2013 from EUR 240 million to EUR 400 million. The new funds were 
earmarked to target economic recovery, civil society and democratic transition.20 
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Humanitarian aid was also made available to Tunisia to help cope with the refugee 
influx from Libya in 2011. The provisions of the three general EU initiatives of 2011 
discussed above also encompassed Tunisia. 
Under these initiatives, support was made available for Tunisian civil society 
organizations (CSOs) and technical support was extended to the transitional 
authorities in the preparation of elections. Following a request from the Tunisian 
authorities, the EU carried out an election observation mission and gave assistance 
to CSOs and to the three commissions set up to look into political reform, corruption 
and abuses of power under the previous regime.21 As detailed in Chapter 2, the 
Tunisians were discerning in their acceptance of the help offered, and found the 
Council of Europe (which is not an EU body) more useful than the EU per se. The 
Council of Europe is, as it proudly states, the European continent’s leading human 
rights organization; all its 47 members are signatories to the European Convention 
on Human Rights, dedicated to the protection of human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law.  
Tunisia was the first country for which the EU set up a Task Force, launched in Tunis 
in September 2011, a month before the first Tunisian elections. HR/VP Ashton and 
Tunisian Prime Minister Béji Caid Essebsi co-chaired the meeting. Also present were 
the President of the Swiss Confederation Micheline Calmy-Rey, members of the 
Tunisian Government, EU Commissioner Stefan Füle, the EU Special 
Representative Bernardino León, as well as representatives of the European 
Parliament, EU member states, the private sector and many international and 
regional financial institutions.22 
At its first meeting the Task Force for Tunisia agreed to start talks to establish a new 
‘Privileged Partnership’ and agree terms for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement (DCFTA). The EU pledged to release EUR 100 million from the SPRING 
programme, together with an additional EUR 57 million for urgent water projects, and 
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EUR 60 million for a new job-creation project. Overall, Tunisia was to receive double 
the original EU allocation for 2011 and a 60 per cent increase in EIB loans.23 
EU member states also launched programmes to assist the transition in Tunisia. 
Germany channelled support to education and job training. Italy opened a line of 
micro-credit of EUR 150 million in Tunisia designed to help young people develop 
artisanal and other small businesses. 24 Representatives of British companies, 
Chambers of Commerce, the UK Foreign Office and other trade-promotion bodies 
conducted several trips to Tunisia to expand trade relations, promote investment and 
forge links with their Tunisian counterparts.25 France, already Tunisia’s leading 
European trade partner, increased its level of imports from Tunisia in 2011, though it 
also increased its sales to the country during the first year of its transition.26 For their 
part, the Tunisians welcomed new business investment, and pointed to the reforms 
underway that would make the economy more conducive to new investors.27 
Against this backdrop, the EU’s HR/VP Ashton and Special Representative 
Bernardino León took the lead in establishing links with key figures in the Tunisian 
government, through the first elections and subsequent power-sharing 
arrangements. These channels enabled the EU to lobby for a change to the draft 
constitution to drop a clause banning normalization of relations ‘with Zionism’. In this 
connection, though, as reported by Richard Youngs: 
One Tunisian activist observed wryly that European help in the constitutional 
drafting process was almost too extensive, to the extent that it led to a 
multiplicity of possible models being conveyed to the drafters.28 
However, Youngs added: ‘In private, the senior Ennahda leadership professed 
satisfaction with European support and detected a greater EU willingness to follow a 
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locally set agenda.’29 Yet other reports indicate that some Tunisian human rights 
groups and journalists felt that EU officials were less inclined to listen to them than to 
Tunisian political leaders and bureaucrats. That would be in keeping with the past 
practice of the EU, whose officials gave precedence to maintaining their access to 
and engagement with partner-state governments over civil society contacts. To 
favour the latter over the former would have been impractical in any case, if not 
detrimental for the civil society pressure groups.  
However, human rights activities across the Arab world could legitimately complain 
that the Europeans could have done more to use their official access to press the 
case for human rights and freedom of expression. After the revolution, the EU 
pledged to give more direct support to civil society groups, but faced a problem in 
deciding which ones and to what extent. Equally, once elections had taken place it 
would have been counterproductive to question the judgements of the new 
government, also one of an Islamist persuasion, on behalf of secular civil society 
critics. In the case of Tunisia, the EU was saved from having to choose sides when 
the leadership of Ennahda itself opted to engage in a national dialogue. That said, it 
appears that the EU did play a role in urging that leadership to do so. 
Overall, the EU had a balancing act to perform in Tunisia, and erred on the side of 
caution and deferring to the preferences of the Tunisian leaders. A modest, 
pragmatic role was perhaps the best option for the EU in the circumstances. Where 
its performance was most disappointing was in terms of the time it took for EU 
financial assistance to reach the Tunisians, and this was because of the nature of 
EU bureaucratic procedures, as discussed above.  
The ‘Advanced Status Agreement’ promised to Tunisia in 2011 was still not finalized 
in 2013. Also, the EU’s new conditionality requirements were not applied 
consistently, with Morocco gaining some of the same benefits promised to Tunisia 
without having to demonstrate the same level of compliance with new rules. Equally, 
EU companies doing business in both countries were not subject to the same levels 
of scrutiny as were Tunisian nationals. Finally, even though EU funding to Tunisia 
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was doubled in the wake of the revolution, the actual amount of money disbursed 
was not on a significant scale. 
Egypt 
As discussed in Chapter 1, on the eve of the Egyptian revolution of 
January/February 2011 Egyptians were suffering from high unemployment or 
underemployment, a reduction in subsidies for basic commodities, relatively low 
literacy rates, a bloated bureaucracy, corruption in government and business, and a 
police state. Some two thirds of the Egyptian population were living below the 
poverty line. The effect of the economic reform measures of the Mubarak regime 
was to improve macroeconomic indicators, to the satisfaction of the IMF and the US 
administration,30 but also to increase the wealth gap between the rich few and the 
impoverished many. The middle classes were being squeezed to the point that they 
were ‘middle class’ only in their aspirations (for jobs and education for their children) 
but not in relative wealth. Middle-class youth were in the forefront of the 
demonstrations that took the country by storm in early 2011. 
The potential for transition to democracy in Egypt was in no sense comparable to 
that in Tunisia. Whereas in the latter there was only a small professional army, in 
Egypt the military was a major institution, with significant business operations and 
interests and used to having the national presidency in the hands of former officers. 
In contrast to the shadowy and much-hated security establishment, the armed forces 
in Egypt enjoyed a level of trust and respect from the population and constituted a 
vehicle for social mobility. The population as a whole, aside from the minority Coptic 
community, was Sunni Muslim, conservative and observant. When faced with an 
Islamist insurgency in the early 1990s, the government had cracked down on the 
activists, imprisoning vast numbers, and co-opted Islam for the state.  
The Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed, but some of its members had chosen to run 
as independents in the parliamentary elections of 2005. In part because the 
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Brotherhood had long been active in providing social services to the poor that the 
state had neglected, and was perceived to be far less corrupt than the political 
establishment and the ruling National Democratic Party, the Brotherhood candidates 
performed well in those elections. At this, the regime took fright and ensured that in 
the next elections it was made almost impossible for them to run again – leading the 
Brotherhood to boycott the poll. Nonetheless, the Muslim Brotherhood was a facet of 
Egyptian society, in its very fabric – alternately suppressed and tacitly tolerated by 
the regime. When the revolution came, the Brotherhood initially stood back, apart 
from some younger activist members, biding its time until capitalizing later. 
In contrast to the Brotherhood, non-aligned and secular civil society groups were not 
well organized or established, even though they were in the forefront of the 
demonstrations in 2011. This is important, because they did not form a coherent 
group that external powers could readily adopt and promote once the revolution 
started. In any case, they were proudly Egyptian and from the start gave little 
indication of wanting external support, let alone interference.  
The real power-brokers were the ruling establishment, including business magnates 
around the regime, the army and the Muslim Brotherhood. The revolution turned out 
to be a contest between them: in retrospect, the military high command, with its 
civilian allies in the establishment, was arguably always in the driving seat. It was the 
military high command that obliged Mubarak to step down, presided over the initial 
transition in the form of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (SCAF), 
allowed Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Mursi to win election to the 
presidency, alternately quarrelled and coordinated with him, and then finally, when 
Mursi tried to surround himself with Brotherhood loyalists, masterminded his ouster 
in summer 2013. 
Exactly how the EU could be expected to play a formative role in 2011–2013 to 
prevent that outcome and help manage a transition to enduring and stable 
democracy – ‘deep democracy’ to use the EU term – is not at all obvious. The path 
that the EU took was a logical one in terms of upholding the principles of democracy 
and human rights that, by its own admission, it had neglected in previous years. The 
EU supported the call for free and fair elections; accommodated to the results of the 
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parliamentary elections in 2011/2012 (subsequently annulled by the Egyptian 
judiciary); extended cautious support to the government of duly elected president 
Mohammed Mursi; sought where possible to influence his decisions in favour of an 
inclusive and non-sectarian administration and constitution; and sought to arrest 
Egypt’s economic crisis by deploying all the mechanisms at its disposal. 
In the initial stages of the Egyptian revolution, the EU was not in a position to 
influence events – which, as in Tunisia, moved at astonishing speed. Neither the 
Europeans nor even the Americans were in a position to save Mubarak from himself, 
once he had chosen to unleash the security services and mobsters on the unarmed 
protesters. It was that spectacle that persuaded the Americans to abandon their 
efforts to induce Mubarak to offer real reforms and call on him to step down. The 
Obama administration has since been castigated by senior Egyptians and their Gulf 
allies, in particular Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for abandoning a faithful ally. 
However, at the heart of the US relationship with Egypt lies a military alliance that 
gives senior US military officers better access to their Egyptian counterparts than 
that enjoyed by US diplomats and politicians. It may be assumed, therefore, that they 
were content with the decision of the Egyptian army first to resist Mubarak’s 
command to fire on the demonstrators, and then to manage his replacement. 
For the EU , essentially the only recourse was to condemn violence and call for a 
peaceful transition, as it did. On 28 January 2011 HR/VP Ashton made the following 
statement: 
I have followed very closely and with profound concern the reports of 
increased violence, clashes and arrests during today’s demonstrations in 
Egypt. 
The continued use of force against demonstrators by police and state security 
forces is deeply troubling. In order to avoid further deterioration of the 
situation in Cairo and elsewhere in Egypt, and to avoid more casualties, I 
reiterate my call on all parties to exercise restraint and calm and I urge the 
authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all peaceful 
demonstrators from detention. 
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I also reiterate my call upon the Egyptian authorities to urgently establish a 
constructive and peaceful way to respond to the legitimate aspirations of 
Egyptian citizens for democratic and socioeconomic reforms. 
I will discuss these developments with my colleagues in the Foreign Affairs 
Council meeting on Monday in Brussels.31 
 
On 3 February 2011 the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK issued 
a joint statement urging ‘a quick and orderly transition to a broad-based government’ 
in Egypt.32 Some individual leaders did show something resembling relief when the 
military took over – for fear of chaos. All through the transition the spectre of an 
ungovernable Egypt was more terrifying than dictatorship. Britain’s David Cameron 
was the first foreign leader to visit Cairo after the military took over, holding talks with 
senior figures. The fact that he was accompanied by a group of British arms 
manufacturers, en route with the Prime Minister to a tour of the Gulf states, 
somewhat tempered Cameron’s pro-democracy message.33 It was also of note that, 
while he did meet some of the protest leaders, Cameron forewent the opportunity to 
meet any leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
As Cameron departed, HR/VP Ashton arrived in Cairo. In a statement following her 
meeting with the Egyptian Foreign Minister she said: 
We have discussed this morning two different aspects of the future: first the 
progress of Egypt towards democracy, and secondly the economic 
requirements for Egypt. Let me be absolutely clear: it is for Egypt to determine 
its future, it is for Egypt to examine with all its expertise the economic issues 
that it faces, and it is for the European Union and the international community 
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to offer support if it is needed and if it is useful, but it will be Egypt that 
decides that that is the case.34 
The tone of her remarks is instructive. Throughout she emphasized that the EU was 
ready to help, but that the lead must come from Cairo. It was always the case that 
the Egyptians dealt with the EU with diplomatic correctness, but with no enthusiasm 
for the minutiae of the ENPI and irritation that so little straightforward development 
aid was forthcoming from the EU. They would have much preferred grants that could 
be disbursed as the Egyptian government deemed best.35 The Egyptian diplomats 
also discerned the underlying cultural particularism of the Europeans in their 
admonitions on reform strategy, democracy and human rights. As of the Egyptian 
revolution, meanwhile, the EU clearly experienced difficulty in gaining cooperation 
from the Egyptians with any of its initiatives. In this the EU was not alone, however, 
since the normal business of government was totally disrupted in Egypt in 2011 and 
went through further uncertainties after Mursi was elected. All international donors 
therefore experienced difficulties assisting with economic recovery, and investors 
were deterred by the uncertainties and instability.36 
The actual amounts released to Egypt under the EU initiatives were not substantial. 
Immediately after Mubarak’s departure, in a gesture to the Egyptian people calling 
for reform, the EU launched a EUR 20 million civil society package. That was in 
addition to EUR 132 million allocated for programmes in 2011. A further EUR 95 
million was already committed for 2012; when the EU rolled out its revised 
programmes to support the Arab states in transition in 2011, it was clearly hoped that 
Egypt would be a beneficiary. Certainly the amount allocated to Egypt between 2011 
and 2013 exceeded 2010 estimates. However, the Egyptians resisted conditionality, 
and the EU insisted it could not extend new loans, such as from the EIB, unless and 
until Egypt accepted IMF conditions for its new facility – which the Egyptians refused.  
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The EU offered electoral observation missions for both the parliamentary and 
presidential elections, but, according to an EU report: ‘The Egyptian authorities 
preferred to decline any offer from international observation missions.’37 However, 
they did accept EUR 2 million under the EU’s Instrument for Stability for the electoral 
commission and some civil society work. The EU’s proposal for a ‘Mobility 
Partnership’ with Egypt was declined pending the installation of a new elected 
government, illustrating Federica Bicchi’s point noted above that the EU could not 
readily find interlocutors with whom to agree programmes during the transition 
period. The EU’s offer to negotiate a DCFTA would have to await the formation of a 
new government in Cairo. 
It was not until November 2012 that the EU’s Egypt Task Force was launched, under 
the joint chairmanship of HR/VP Ashton and Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed 
Amr. The launch was a key outcome of the visit to Brussels made by the new 
President Mursi in September 2012. The attendees at the launch included 
Commission Vice-President Tajani, Commissioner Füle, the EU Special 
Representative for the Southern Mediterranean Region Bernardino León, the EU 
Special Representative for Human Rights Stavros Lambrinidis, ministers of the 
Egyptian government, European Foreign Ministers, Members of the European 
Parliament, business leaders, senior officials from European and international 
financial institutions, as well as representatives from civil society. Ahead of the 
launch the EU approved two programmes for Egypt worth EUR120 million in new 
support for jobs and vocational training targeted at young people.  
As recorded in the EU’s press release after the Task Force meeting: 
The EU undertook to provide a total of nearly €5 billion in the form of loans 
and grants for 2012–2013. The EU already provides 80% of inward 
investment into Egypt and the Task Force confirmed the European Union as 
Egypt’s largest economic partner.  
Vice-President of the European Commission Antonio Tajani organized  
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a Business and Tourism Summit, ahead of the Task Force, where European 
and Egyptian CEOs discussed investment opportunities in Egypt.  
102 European business leaders came to Cairo representing companies with a 
combined turnover of 600 billion euros – equivalent to the GDP of the 
Netherlands. Around 200 Egyptian business leaders were also present. 
(…) 
The European Commission committed to provide additional financial support 
to Egypt for an overall amount of nearly 800 million euros (LE 6.2 billion). This 
is made up of 303 million euros in the form of grants and 450 million euros in 
loans. This is on top of the 449 million already provided by the EU to Egypt for 
the period 2011–2013.  
The President of the European Investment Bank (EIB), Werner Hoyer, 
announced potential lending of up to one billion euros per year(nearly LE 8 
billion), more than doubling the bank's recent activity in Egypt and making the 
country the biggest recipient of EIB loans in the Middle East and North African 
Region.  
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) confirmed 
the start of operations in Egypt this month and announced plans to ramp up 
lending volumes to 1billion per year. 38  
 
The EU also pledged to double Egypt’s participation in the Erasmus Mundus and 
Tempus higher education programmes. EU Special Representative for Human 
Rights Lambrinidis hosted more than 40 civil society organizations to discuss Egypt's 
transition, including issues such as human rights, NGO registration, freedom of 
assembly, trafficking, police methods, media freedom, and Internet freedom. During 
the period when the SCAF was running the country, Egyptian Human Rights 
organizations and NGOs had suffered a curtailment of their rights, activities and 
funding which the EU and its member states proved unable to counter.  
After Mursi was elected. many Egyptian activists criticized the EU for being too eager 
to forge a working relationship with his new administration and reluctant to confront 
                                            
38
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/133513.pdf  
Hollis, R (2016) ‘The Role of the European Union’ in Lodgaard, Sverre ed., External Powers 
and the Arab Spring Oslo: Scandinavian Academic Press, pp.163-198. 
 
Author’s pre-publication copy – to cite refer to published version. 
 
24 
 
continuing human rights abuses. For its part the EU seems to have been anxious not 
to appear prejudiced against working with the Islamists, since they were the people’s 
choice. Task Force efforts to promote civil society appeared not to make much 
difference, especially when Mursi subsequently introduced a new law to constrain 
NGO activities. EU objections to this, including a plea from Angela Merkel directly to 
Mursi to tone it down, were not successful, but the government was not penalized. In 
practice the ‘more for more’ principle could also mean ‘more for less’ in cases where 
keeping access to the government was deemed more important than defending its 
critics. Once Mursi had been ousted, the Sisi government cracked down even more 
harshly. When the ‘G8 Forum for the Future’ met in Cairo in December 2013, NGOs 
were barred from attending, for the first time since it had started to incorporate civil 
society groups at its meetings.  
In retrospect it looked as though HR/VP Ashton and other senior officials began to 
assume that the relative ease of access they enjoyed with the Mursi administration, 
in contrast to the SCAF and the Sisi government, gave them more influence than 
was actually the case. The EU is assiduous in recording all official visits, meetings, 
statements, injunctions, pledges and intentions. The net effect can be to give the 
impression of meaningful action, when all they are doing is publicizing their side of 
the story. When Mursi finally fell afoul of the senior military in Egypt, Ashton offered 
to mediate, but was rebuffed. When the Americans urged the EU not to call Mursi’s 
ouster a ‘coup’, the EU concurred. 
Libya 
The crisis in Libya, brought on by the determination of the Qaddafi family to crush all 
those who had risen up in the name of reform, produced a range of reactions in 
Europe. As violence erupted across parts of Libya and a rebellion surfaced in 
Benghazi, on 26 February 2011 the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on 
members of the Qaddafi regime. On 28 February EU governments approved a 
package of sanctions against Qaddafi and his closest advisers including an arms 
embargo and bans on travel to the EU. Beyond these measures, however, there was 
no consensus in the EU. 
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Within days of an announcement by the Libyan National Council in Benghazi that it 
was the sole representative of Libya, on 10 March 2011 French President Sarkozy 
took the unilateral step of recognizing the opposition body, without even consulting 
the French Foreign Minister, let alone other Europeans. Sarkozy and British Prime 
Minister David Cameron took the lead in calling for more vigorous action and 
imposition of a no-fly zone to contain the Libyan government reprisals against the 
rebels. The German government opposed military intervention. International tensions 
mounted as Qaddafi launched a land offensive against the rebellious town of 
Benghazi in mid-March.  
On 17 March the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, to impose a no-fly 
zone over Libya and permit resort to force to protect Libyan civilians against attack. 
Germany, serving on the UN Security Council at the time, opted to abstain. Other 
international players were also divided on what to do. South Africa voted for 
Resolution 1973, but Brazil and India were against, and in due course the African 
Union became critical of the way the British and French used the Resolution as 
cover for a campaign that went beyond a strict interpretation of the UN mandate to 
protect civilians. China was opposed from the start, and Russia reacted angrily to the 
way the Europeans and Americans took charge of the military campaign and 
pressed their advantage once Qaddafi was eventually toppled. One of the legacies 
of the Libya crisis was that both Russia and China subsequently prevented the 
adoption of a resolution on Syria along the same lines as that adopted on Libya. 
In Italy senior political figures were initially divided on what to do, not least because 
Italy was so dependent on energy supplies from Libya and had invested heavily in 
the Libyan economy. Once it became clear that Qaddafi was beyond redemption, the 
Italians, as well as the Turks, toyed with the idea of offering the Libyan leader a safe 
exit, even as the British and French advocated bringing him before the International 
Court in The Hague. Eventually, Italy and Turkey committed to supporting the Libyan 
opposition. The members of the Arab League, having called for international action 
to counter Qaddafi, subsequently adopted different approaches, with Qatar taking 
the lead in recognizing the Libyan National Council – subsequently the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) – and  agreed to purchase oil directly from it.  
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Disarray best describes the stance of the EU member states on the Libyan crisis. 
Initially, as violence engulfed the country, the task of evacuating foreign nationals 
was pursued without coordination. The Chinese had tens of thousands of workers in 
need of rescue and set about the task on their own. Individual European states 
struggled with logistics and requisitioning civilian transport to repatriate their 
nationals. Egyptian and other Arab and African nationals working in Libya swarmed 
to the airports, ports and borders, in scenes of desperation and chaos. 
The military operation to intercept the Libyan forces’ advance on Benghazi began 
with air attacks on 19 March 2011. Finding the US side reluctant to take a decisive 
lead, the French and British found themselves at the forefront, although heavily 
dependent on US firepower to deliver on their objectives. They decided to give 
charge of the operations to NATO. Not all NATO members were to participate in the 
operations, however. Of all the EU member states only Britain, France, Denmark and 
Belgium participated with the USA in targeting Libyan forces. Spain, the Netherlands, 
Greece, Sweden and Italy took part in the air operations but did not mount attack 
missions. As the campaign wore on, it was the UK and France that eventually dared 
to attack Libyan regime targets, but they incurred criticism for neglecting to protect 
pro-regime as well as other civilians in the process.   
Having agreed to impose sanctions and an arms embargo in February, the EU took 
a while to come up with any further measures. For this the EU as such can hardly be 
blamed, given the absence of consensus among its members – which demonstrates 
just how constrained the EU can be as an international actor. In any case, erring on 
the side of caution, HR/VP Ashton declared that the EU position must be limited to 
neutral humanitarian support. In early March she sent a senior diplomat to Benghazi 
to establish contact with the NTC and subsequently sent a fact finding mission to 
Tripoli. By the time the EU finally came up with a detailed initiative, at the end of 
March, the momentum had already passed to the coalition operating under the 
NATO umbrella. 
The European Council decision of 1 April 2011 was for ‘a European Union military 
operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis 
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situation in Libya (EUFOR Libya)’.39 The mission was to be for a period of four 
months, budgeted at EUR 7.9 million. For it to go into action, however, required a 
request from the UN’s Office of Humanitarian Affairs – which never came. Germany 
was on board for EUFOR Libya, but Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
UK were critical – fearing that the operation would cut across and complicate existing 
NATO-coordinated air strikes. In other words, the EU as a body proved largely 
irrelevant in the initial stages of the Libya crisis. It came into its own when 
preparations began for the post-Qaddafi era, though again there were problems of 
coordination among member states. 
On 13 July 2011, following a meeting with NTC Chairman Mahmoud Jibril, EU 
President Barroso issued a statement welcoming ‘the vision’ of the NTC for the 
future of Libya and announcing that the EU had already begun ‘to mobilize our 
resources to support this political transition, in close cooperation with our 
international partners, especially the UN, and also the African Union and the Arab 
League’. Stressing that ‘it is of course for our Libyan partners to define what they see 
as priorities’ and that ‘Libyan leadership, Libyan ownership are essential’, he went on 
to say: 
EU expertise with political transitions can play a key role: for instance support 
in the organization and supervision of free and fair elections; hands-on help 
with the creation of an effective administration and judiciary; support to the 
organization of the civil society and free media, all of which are vital for a 
stable country.40  
He also noted that the EU could be of help ‘with the security sector reform and the 
design of macro-economic policies’ and underlined that: ‘The EU is by far the largest 
donor of humanitarian aid in and around Libya. Our support so far is worth EUR 140 
million (EUR 80 million come from European Commission).’ The thrust of Barroso’s 
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statement was very much in keeping with the line adopted by the EU on the 
transitions in other parts of the Arab world.  
Qaddafi finally met his demise on 20 August. Presented with an array of offers of 
support, from the EU, the USA, Qatar, Turkey, various EU member states, the NTC 
declined the offer of a UN stabilization or protection force, asking instead for a UN 
technical mission.41 According to Guma El-Gamaty of the NTC, they were blessed 
with a range of detailed plans provided by the UN, the Americans and the British for 
how to proceed with state building, but lacked the capacity – the basic institutions – 
to implement any of the proposed measures on the ground.42 Moreover, the fall of 
Qaddafi was followed by skirmishes among competing factions and militia; in 
retrospect, insufficient effort was placed on disarming the militia quickly. As 
multinational companies returned to Libya, they actually employed competing militia 
to provide their personnel and operations with security. Libyans accused such 
companies of a grab for Libyan resources. 
For its part, the EU’s EEAS representatives decided that EU support to Libya should 
be channelled through the UN. They set great store by pursuing diplomatic efforts to 
persuade India, Brazil and China to re-engage. Sidelined in the military campaign 
phase of Libya’s transition, the EU was intent on building a multinational programme 
for the rebuilding of Libya. However, other players were not listening. The UN, 
meanwhile, reduced its presence in the country and did not provide leadership. The 
EU nonetheless went ahead, initiating various programmes for emergency aid, 
support for the NTC in setting up an interim government, rebuilding the health and 
education sectors, civil society groups, vocational training, and the reintegration of 
militia members into the workforce.43 
Among EU member states, France and the UK were the most engaged, but others 
also offered technical assistance. Italy’s contribution notably included technical help 
with border and migration control – providing a reminder that that aspect of 
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 Speaking at a meeting on Libya at the European Council on Foreign Relations London 
office on 31 March 2011. 
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European thinking on the Mediterranean was still a key consideration. Yet this was 
the period of austerity in Europe, and EU member states simply could not muster the 
amount of cash required to rebuild a country overnight. They looked to the Gulf 
states to do that, while the Libyans themselves tended to believe that their own oil 
wealth should be sufficient, but lacked the capacity to manage the energy sector for 
the national good, as sectoral interests began to compete for revenue streams. 
The first Libyan elections in 2012 went off smoothly, and fears that Islamists would 
win a majority proved unwarranted. Consequently, through 2012 the EU was still 
operating on the assumption that development support could be delivered through 
the usual ENP mechanisms. However, one effect of the presence of Islamist groups 
alongside tribal groupings in Libya was to engender suspicion of Western and 
multinational motives in the rebuilding of the country. The fact that civil society 
groups proliferated was also not necessarily a positive sign, since it was almost 
impossible to tell which ones could be relied upon to act accountably and use the 
funds disbursed to them for the intended purposes. In short, the task of rebuilding a 
state from scratch in Libya proved too big for the elected government or the EU and 
its member states to manage, in the face of competing interests and disunity among 
the Libyans. 
Conclusions 
Judging the EU by its own rhetoric and initiatives, the desire to help the Tunisians, 
Egyptians and Libyans transit to democracy was genuine. However, as discussed 
here and in other chapters, the main drivers of events in all these countries were 
indigenous. There was only so much that any outside bodies, however well-endowed 
with skilled personnel and resources, could do to influence developments – short of 
occupation, and that was neither wanted nor on offer. 
Equally, the EU member states could not abandon their own security agendas, and 
had become accustomed to mixing their aid policies with ever more complex deals 
and arrangements for controlling migration flows and combatting terrorism. These 
structures had developed in parallel with their reform policies and sometimes 
undermined them. 
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The EU was also limited in terms of how much money it could spend and how 
quickly, not only by its own bureaucratic procedures, but also in terms of limited 
capacity on the receiving end. Had the EU been able to deploy really nimble, flexible 
small teams of technical experts with money to spend immediately and the ability 
(and language capabilities) to work on the ground, at the civil society as well as the 
government level, that might have proven more effective more quickly than the 
slowly grinding Brussels bureaucratic machine that devises the ‘instruments’ through 
which aid is disbursed. 
However, the EU is captive to its own Neighbourhood Policy, with its Action Plans, 
statistical measurements, budgeting cycles, and distant promises of ‘harmonization’ 
with the internal market leading to economic rewards in the long run. This is a highly 
cumbersome machine for running relations with the neighbours, and the EEAS 
diplomats cannot exercise much initiative or flexibility outside the structure that binds 
the EU machine. Senior EU officials also have to make their mark and compete with 
their peers to gain access to foreign leaders, and may end up concentrating on 
announcements and visits more than strategy and content. 
The EU is also a mindset as well as a machine. Initial talk by the EU of wanting to 
‘partner’ the Tunisians, Egyptians and Tunisians in realizing their aspirations was 
presumptuous, not to say naïve; so was the assumption that the EU was uniquely 
qualified, by its experience of  incorporating new member states into the fold, to help 
those outside. That experience was only very partially relevant, given that 
neighbouring countries were never going to be embraced within the European family.  
Nor did the Arab states want to be thus embraced. They were and remain keen to 
realize their aspirations within their own polity and culture. Their history of being on 
the receiving end of European imperialism has left a legacy. Rather than chafing at 
this sensitivity about interference, the EU appears to have grasped the limits of its 
own potential in the context of the Arab Spring and opted for an approach that, while 
disappointing and somewhat disingenuous, was at least not overbearing or 
downright damaging. 
 
